Mechanism Design for Near Real-Time Retail Payment and Settlement Systems by GUO, Zhiling et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
1-2015
Mechanism Design for Near Real-Time Retail
Payment and Settlement Systems
Zhiling GUO
Singapore Management University, ZHILINGGUO@smu.edu.sg
Robert John KAUFFMAN
Singapore Management University, rkauffman@smu.edu.sg
Mei LIN
Singapore Management University, mlin@smu.edu.sg
Dan MA
Singapore Management University, madan@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2015.573
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, E-Commerce Commons, and the Management
Information Systems Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
GUO, Zhiling; KAUFFMAN, Robert John; LIN, Mei; and MA, Dan. Mechanism Design for Near Real-Time Retail Payment and
Settlement Systems. (2015). 48th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences HICSS 2015: 5-8 January, Kauai: Proceedings.
4824-4833. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/2495
Mechanism Design for Near Real-Time Retail Payment  
and Settlement Systems  
 
Zhiling Guo, Robert J. Kauffman, Mei Lin and Dan Ma 
Singapore Management University 
{zhilingguo, rkauffman, mlin, madan}@smu.edu.sg 
 
Abstract 
Rapid expansion of e-commerce, along with rising domestic 
and cross-border payments, has fueled the demand among 
financial institutions for cost-effective means to achieve real-
time settlement of retail payments. Traditionally, retail pay-
ments have made extensive use of interbank netting systems, 
in which payments are accumulated for end-of-day settle-
ment. This approach, known as deferred net settlement 
(DNS), reduces the liquidity needs of a payment system, but 
bears inherent operational risks. As large dollar volumes of 
retail payments accumulate swiftly, real-time gross settle-
ment (RTGS) is an attractive option. It permits immediate 
settlement of transactions during the day, but it brings up 
other risks that require consideration. We propose a hybrid 
payment management system involving elements of both DNS 
and RTGS. We explore several hybrid system mechanism 
designs to allow payment prioritization, reduce payment 
delays, enhance liquidity by pooling payments from banks, 
and optimize settlement. We provide a modeling framework 
and experimental set-up to evaluate the proposed approach. 
Our results shed new light about cost-effective and value-
maximizing mechanisms to quickly settle increasingly large 
volumes of retail payments. 
_________________________________________________ 
“Only at the end of the day were the inter-bank claims set-
tled, on a net basis. [The] system worked well: so long as 
[the] payments could be made then settlement went ahead. 
[I]f just one bank could not make its payments, the whole 
inter-bank settlement process would have been disrupted. 
This exposed a severe vulnerability – potentially threatening 
the stability of the entire financial system – if a bank failed.”  
Tim Hampton [21], Economist, Financial Markets  
Department, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 1999. 
 
1. Introduction  
The growth of global e-commerce, domestic pay-
ments, and cross-border payments has created new 
demand for real-time gross settlement (RTGS) for 
payments [8]. Compared with large-value payments 
that rely on central bank-operated settlement systems 
[5], retail payments make extensive use of interbank 
netting systems [9]. As retail payment flows accumu-
late with high velocity, large dollar volumes for settle-
ment build up and the inherent operational risks in a 
netting system increase. These days, there is increasing 
interest worldwide to bring the capabilities of real-time 
processing and settlement to retail payments [27]. Fi-
nancial innovation and market globalization have 
pushed banks to embrace cost-effective RTGS [1, 12].  
Historically, interbank payments have been settled 
by using deferred net settlement (DNS) mechanisms, 
such as clearing houses and netting systems, where 
payments are accumulated and settlement is delayed 
[24]. Netting is an efficient way to reduce the liquidity 
needs of a payment system. The delays in settlement 
create vulnerabilities for the financial system though. 
The risk of liquidity raises concerns for retail pay-
ments, as well as wholesale settlement [17] and other 
types of high-value payments. In the 2011 UBS scan-
dal, for example, a trader exploited the delay of ex-
change-traded funds (ETF) transactions by creating 
fake hedges that later caused more than US$2 billion 
dollars in losses for UBS [33].  
RTGS payments are processed individually and set-
tlement occurs with finality in the full amount immedi-
ately [26]. Although this may reduce operational risk 
by avoiding short-term debt between participants, it is 
higher in operational cost and creates intraday liquidity 
needs to smooth payment flows that are not synchro-
nized. Central banks provide intraday liquidity for a fee 
or require it to be backed by collateral to control risk. 
By giving intraday credit, central banks assume risk. 
RTGSs have been implemented among central 
banks for large-value payments since 1990 [2, 25, 39].1 
More recently there have been cross-border RTGS 
systems initiatives. An example is TARGET2 RTGS 
by the European Central Bank [15, 16] for large-value 
funds transfers between banks in Europe. RTGS is less 
of a reality for retail, though there have been initiatives 
indicative of future trends in the market.2,3  
                                                
1 Well-known systems include China’s National Advanced Payment 
System (CNAPS) [13], Hong Kong’s Clearing House Automated 
Transfer System (CHATS) [13], Mexico’s Sistema de Pagos Elec-
trónicos Interbancarios (SPEI) [11], the Monetary Authority of Sin-
gapore’s Electronic Payment System Plus (MEPS+) [11], and the 
U.S. Federal Reserve Wire Network (Fedwire) [13, 31]. 
2 They include the Faster Payments Service (www.fasterpayments. 
org.uk) implemented in the U.K. since the mid-2000s, the mobile 
3 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunica-
tions (SWIFT) is at the epicenter of these developments, since its 
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 Hybrid centralized payment management systems 
that combine various functions of RTGS, DNS, and 
payment priority queuing represent another possible 
solution [10, 46]. Queue-augmented real-time systems 
queue payments using a centralized or internal queue 
managed by individual banks, as these payments enter 
the system [35, 36]. Such hybrid systems will have less 
delay than end-of-day netting systems, and will lower 
liquidity needs to a greater extent than RTGS does. 
Efficiency gains and cost savings can be achieved by 
consolidating payment streams into a central platform.  
The transformation of payment and settlement sys-
tems raises mechanism design issues.4 One is the par-
ticipation incentive for banks [3].5 Since each bank has 
its own unique liquidity needs, it is not clear whether 
every bank will be interested in participating in a real-
time or hybrid settlement system. Other important 
questions related to banks’ participation also arise. For 
example, how will the central bank’s credit policy af-
fect the banks’ intraday borrowing? Will all of the par-
ticipating banks be better off from the liquidity pooling 
benefits of centralized payment management?  
The second challenge is incentive compatibility 
[38]. Since individual banks have private information 
and make decisions about when to place payments into 
the central queuing system, do they have an incentive 
to delay submission? If so, what is the economic ex-
planation? Also, will decentralized submission of pay-
ments and uncoordinated decision-making make cen-
tralized payment management system less valuable for 
the banks? Delayed and asynchronous submission of 
payments will adversely affect a payment settlement 
system’s ability to match the payments it received with 
cash for final settlement. So a market mechanism 
should take into consideration how the banks will re-
lease their payments for settlement and coordinate 
them to synchronize their actions to mitigate the possi-
ble failure of an RTGS-based hybrid mechanism. 
The third issue is liquidity [7, 24, 28, 29]. After 
payments are submitted to the central payment man-
                                                                         
payment mechanism design and technology staff have been involved 
in planning the implementation of large-value payment settlement 
systems around the world for over 25 years. SWIFT has experience 
in 20-plus small-value payment systems too [32]. 
4 The design of a hybrid system is not trivial, if key economic con-
siderations are made. Various operational and liquidity costs must be 
spread across many transactions when delayed net settlement is used, 
and the operational costs of handling individual transactions in real-
time gross settlement is high. A central design challenge is to 
achieve real-time speed at low cost, while ensuring liquidity for 
“anytime” settlement, so banks avoid unnecessary reserves.  
5 This problem arises whether participation is accomplished through 
settlement tiering or piggybacking. This occurs with foreign banks in 
the U.S. that are not members of the Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ments Systems (CHIPS). Australia’s Reserve Bank Information and 
Transfer Systems (RITS) impose minimum requirements for banks 
to participate, as opposed to avoid participation through settlement 
tiering relationships with other banks. 
agement system, having an effective payment settle-
ment rule is crucial for market liquidity. It directly af-
fects how payments in the queue from different banks 
get settled. In addition to the liquidity created by pay-
ment pooling from participating banks, the centralized 
system (possibly managed by a digital intermediary 
representing the central bank) may extend credit that 
allows the system operators to economize on liquidity. 
Successful development and implementation of the 
hybrid system requires a deep understanding of the 
economic incentives and business value that arise from 
the adoption of a multi-sided technology platform like 
a centralized payment management system. Retail and 
corporate customers, merchants and banks, and gov-
ernment regulators all have a stake in achieving effec-
tive outcomes. A systematic evaluation of hybrid sys-
tem performance should consider the banks’ participa-
tion incentives, and central bank’s credit and liquidity 
provision decision policies. 
We address key mechanism design issues for an ef-
fective hybrid payment settlement system from the 
infrastructure design, participation incentives, and 
market coordination perspectives. These cover retail 
and financial services in the economy, information in 
the payment process, technology as a solution for digi-
tal intermediation, and economics as a theoretical lens 
through which to view and resolve some of the issues.  
We ask:  What constitutes an efficient design for a 
hybrid centralized payment management system that 
will support fully-automated straight-through (FAST) 
processing of payment settlements at low cost?  How 
does a central payment management system solution 
alter the banks’ economic incentives and payment 
submission tactics, and reduce their operational costs 
while controlling credit risks? And how are the techno-
logical developments, bank behavior, and regulations 
likely to drive market adoption for RTGS innovations? 
2. Literature  
RTGS, DNS, and hybrid settlement systems all 
have been discussed in the literature since the 1990s. 
Recently, Johnson et al. [24] proposed a deferred set-
tlement mechanism based on the settlement of queued 
payments related to incoming payment value and not 
the account balance. Their mechanism reduces intraday 
credit extensions while modestly delaying the average 
time of payment settlement. They showed that the 
preference for RTGS or a hybrid system depends on 
how credit risk and liquidity efficiency trade-off.  
Bech and Garratt [2] analyzed bank behavior under 
three credit regimes: free intraday, collateralized, and 
priced credit. Among these three, free credit is not a 
viable option for most central banks due to risk and 
moral hazard. They reported that collateralized credit is 
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 the prevalent option in Europe, while priced credit 
dominates in the U.S. They showed that payment de-
lays emerge under various intraday credit policy re-
gimes. They counter-intuitively concluded that it may 
be socially efficient for banks to delay payments. 6 
There are benefits to synchronizing payments under 
priced credit. A related issue is how banks should co-
ordinate.  
Prior research also has assessed the benefit of pay-
ment settlement systems with simulation [24, 29] and 
agent-based methods [18], and examined the network 
topology of payments, and how payments to and from 
banks shift in the presence of market shocks [40]. A 
major limitation in this line of work is that bank behav-
ior is typically viewed as exogenous to the system. In 
reality, banks will initiate actions, based on their own 
underlying decision-making motivations, such as 
which payments will be submitted to the system, what 
time submission will occur, and whether it is based on 
the payer, the nature of the transaction, etc.  
Thus, we expect that the banks’ actions should be 
endogenous and will largely depend on the payment 
system design. Guo et al. [19, 20] provided a theoreti-
cal and experimental market design framework to 
model order submissions, trade matching, and market-
clearing dynamics in a distributed system based on 
economic considerations of value. Similar to their ap-
proach, we focus on the hybrid system’s mechanism 
design by considering the participating banks’ actions, 
the central bank’s liquidity-related credit policy, and 
how the central payment management policy is struc-
tured. Various types of hybrid systems are possible 
based on the mechanism design ideas that we will dis-
cuss. We evaluate the performance of the proposed 
mechanisms using experimental methods.    
3. Mechanism, Model and Management  
We next outline a simplified hybrid settlement 
mechanism that implements the central payment man-
agement approach, and combines DNS and RTGS. Our 
model includes payment timing, credit risk, delay cost 
and settlement emphasizing the banks’ viewpoint. 
3.1. A Payment Settlement Mechanism Design 
We propose a hybrid retail payment settlement 
mechanism that also provides liquidity management 
functions. These include setting payment priorities, 
maintaining payment inventories in reserve, pooling 
liquidity from participating banks, and optimizing 
payment settlement. Our proposed approach is differ-
                                                
6 For a discussion of how banks handle synchronization of payments 
inflows and outflows, and how this affects the timing of their pay-
ment order submissions into a settlement system, see McAndrews 
and Rajan [31], who describe this for Fedwire in the U.S. 
ent from other RTGSs in which banks are able to bor-
row money from the central bank to strengthen their 
intraday liquidity to meet transactions demand. The 
system we propose pools liquidity from all of the par-
ticipating banks through the use of a centralized pay-
ment queue management system that we call a central 
payment queuing system (CPQS). It offsets a bank’s 
payment orders using pooled receipts from other banks 
and the central bank’s inventory, which makes settle-
ment short and effective. 
We also combine other aspects of netting and queu-
ing in payment settlement. In CPQS, the amount of 
payments received in a one-minute period (or some 
other flexibly-determined period of time) provides the 
available liquidity for other payments to be released 
from the queue. Payments can be settled when CPQS 
receives sufficient incoming funds. Payments subject 
to deferral will be held in queue if they have not been 
offset by other incoming payments during that minute. 
Queuing enables the banks to automatically synchro-
nize their outgoing payments with their incoming 
payments. CPQS will pool liquidity and be more effec-
tive in offsetting payments as more banks participate, a 
network effect [1], though competitive externalities 
may arise in the process [2].  
The proposed process. As shown in Figure 1, first, 
payment orders arrive at the banks, for example, an 
ATM transaction, a payment to a merchant, or a mobile 
payment. Each bank will set its own payment priority. 
Orders with high priority will be settled in real-time at 
individual banks, while orders of low priority will en-
ter CPQS and queue with other banks’ payment re-
quests, with or without a priority rank. CPQS pools all 
payment orders from all of the participating banks.  
Figure 1. A Hybrid Payment Settlement Mechanism 
with a Central Payment Queuing System (CPQS) 
 
In each one-minute interval, the system will check 
whether the total value of the payment orders received 
is greater than the total value of the queued payment. If 
this is the case, then all of the queued payment orders 
will be settled – in essence, full near real-time settle-
ment – and the queue will be cleared. If the total value 
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 of the payments received plus the central queue’s in-
ventory (if any is present) is less than the value of all 
of the queued payment, then partial near real-time 
settlement will occur. If the central payment queue is 
rank-ordered, then the top-ranked orders will be 
cleared first. If the central queue is not rank-ordered, 
then the payment orders to be settled will be deter-
mined by the CPQS settlement mechanism. All unset-
tled payment orders will remain in the central queue, 
either to wait for incoming payments in the next mi-
nute, or be netted if it is the end-of-day netting time. 
3.2. Model 
Since different settlement rules in CPQS imply dif-
ferent payment priorities, the economic behavior of 
banks will be influenced by the rules of the payment 
system. In addition to the settlement rules, we consider 
several key factors influencing banks’ decisions: pay-
ment timing, credit risk, and delay cost. We focus on 
quantifying the effects of different settlement ap-
proaches on banks’ behavior and performance, and 
demonstrating how transaction pooling-related benefits 
arise in our hybrid payment settlement system. 
Through our economic analysis, we are also able to 
gain insights into infrastructure mechanism design for 
settlement systems.  
Assumptions. We assume payment orders arrive 
according to a Poisson process. The time between arri-
vals of payment orders has an exponential distribution 
with parameter . The bank determines payment time-
criticality and assigns different priorities to payment 
orders. High-priority payment orders go to the real-
time queue for immediate settlement. Low-priority 
payment orders–regular payment orders in the bank’s 
business–go to CPQS. These regular payment orders 
will be queued for pooled settlement with a possible 
time delay that is viewed as an economic trade-off. 
Suppose there are  banks in total, each operating 
 minutes during a day. We define these variables as: 
•  : the dollar amount of the payment order made at 
time that go from bank  to bank ; 
•  : the dollar amount of the payment order settled 
in real time at time  from bank  to bank ; 
• 

 : a payment order from bank   to bank  that 
enters the central queue at time , with priority rank 
 in the queue, and 
  if no rank is assigned;  
•  : bank  ’s set of released payments from the 
central queue at time . 
• : bank ’s available account balance at time . 
We further assume that no two payment orders that 
go from bank  to bank  will arrive at the same time. 
Also, once a payment order is settled, it will be re-
moved from the queue immediately.7  
The bank’s decision. Banks have heterogeneous 
preferences regarding settlement delays and the credit 
risks they may have to bear related to the customers for 
whom they handle payments. Compared to RTGS, 
other alternative designs typically trade off credit risk 
with payment settlement delays [30, 37, 46].  
Banks asynchronously receive heterogeneous pay-
ment requests. In a near real-time system, the bank will 
make two decisions at the end of each minute to priori-
tize its payment orders: the number of high priority 
orders   that will get settled immediately and the 
number of regular payment orders  that will be sub-
mitted to CPQS. Since real-time settlement has no de-
lay cost, the bank’s decision is to minimize the total 
cost of its payment order delay up to time  in a day, 
plus a credit penalty with a per unit cost , when the 
bank’s account balance is negative.  
At the end of each minute , bank i’s problem is to 
assign order priority by determining {, }: what 
orders should settled immediately or be submitted for 
CPQS queuing, subject to a balance constraint: 


 




 



    
  
 
  
  


 


 


 

        
In bank i’s objective function, the term      
measures its delay cost related to bank j. We can think 
of this as an agreed upon penalty for missing a value 
date that requires compensation for unavailable funds, 
or a diminution in goodwill between the banks. The 
summation over j is its total delay costs related to all 
other banks. The summation up to time  is the cumu-
lative delay cost for all its unsettled payments in the 
central queue. The term   is bank i’s credit 
penalty, which is incurred only if   , when bank i 
faces a negative account balance at the end of minute 
 . Since  is the cumulative measure of bank ’s 
available funds, it does not have the summation sign. 
The objective function reflects a bank’s trade-off be-
tween the costs of obtaining liquidity from the central 
bank and delaying payments by choosing which ones 
to submit to the central queue. 
The balance constraint specifies bank i’s account 
balance at the end of minute mwhich should be equal 
to its account balance at the end of the previous mi-
nute, 
minus the payment orders settled in real 
                                                
7 If they arrive together, two payment orders can be combined into 
one order. This is a technical assumption to ease our exposition. 
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 time from bank i to other banks, between time m - 1 
and m (  ), plus the receipt of payments 
settled in real time from other banks to bank i, during 
time m - 1 and m (  ), and minus regular 
payment orders from bank i to other banks that are 
settled by the central queue within the one-minute in-
terval  (   ). The set of released payments 

 is identified by the CPQS rule. 
3.3. Management  
The CPQS design involves rules for order entry, 
queuing and settlement that define the management 
process for hybrid payment settlement. For example, 
orders may enter the queue using a first-in, first-out 
(FIFO) rule. Payments entering earlier will be given 
higher priority. Priorities for payments can also be 
based on other criteria. One is the personal payment 
history of a customer [45]. Another is payment value, 
as in the Clearing House Automated Payment System 
(CHAPS) in the U.K. There are many other ways to set 
the priority. Such criteria assign a priority to payments 
entering the queue.  
Settlement criteria define the rules to release 
queued payments. Settlement at the end of each minute 
allows multiple payments to settle simultaneously, if 
offsetting funds to match are found. By the end of each 
minute, certain payment orders can be released from 
the queue as soon as sufficient receipts arrive to cover 
the outgoing funds. Also at the beginning of each mi-
nute, queued payments are reset to reflect new orders 
and settlements. At the end of the day, all payment 
orders in the queue will be netted. Of course, the end-
of-day netting (late netting) can be adjusted to reflect 
other design considerations, such as hourly (frequent 
netting) and noon netting (early netting). 
Ranked queue clearing. The system assigns a rank 
to currently active payment orders in the queue. As-
sume that at time  a total of  payment orders are in 
the queue. 

 is the payment amount that enters the 
central queue at time , which goes from bank   to 
bank , and is currently ranked in the th position. The 
payment order-matching problem is:  









    
  


  



 , 
   . 
The objective is to choose the top -ranked pay-
ment orders for settlement so the total delay cost up to 
time  for orders still in queue is minimized. CPQS 
settlement constrains that the first  queued payment 
orders are released at the end of minute  when the 
value of the total pooled receipts within that minute are 
greater than or equal to the value of the  ranked pay-
ments. This constraint assumes the central bank does 
not provide any liquidity to CPQS. If the central bank 
offers liquidity level through credit, the constraint 
can be modified to 


  

  . 
After settlement, the rank will be adjusted. 
Non-ranked queue clearing.   is the payment 
amount from bank  to bank  at time  that enters the 
central queue. Assume the system maintains a liquidity 
level . The maximum liquidity level that the central 
bank provides will not be larger than the total credit 
cost the central bank has to bear in a decentralized sys-
tem. Otherwise, it would be inefficient to use a central-
ized system. The related order-matching problem is:  










     
  
  






 




  

   
Here,   is a binary decision variable. When 

  the payment order from bank  to bank  that 
enters the system at time  is not chosen to be matched, 
so it imposes a delay cost of      on the system. 
When   , the payment order will be matched. As a 
result, the order is removed from the queue and there is 
no delay related to this order. The objective is to mini-
mize the total payment delay cost by selecting pay-
ments from the CPQS queue to settle without violating 
the settlement constraint. The constraint ensures the net 
settlement amount, with outgoing payments removed, 
will not exceed system liquidity . 
Note that here we have not specified how partici-
pating banks finally get compensated by contribution 
to the central payment inventory pool.  A number of 
possibilities for this may affect the model that we have 
proposed. One is a per transaction fee when payment 
inventory is drawn down. The second possibility is 
similar, only any fees would be based on the dollar 
amount of the payments that are covered. Pricing in 
this manner is likely to be ineffective though, since it 
will only diminish the attractiveness of the mechanism 
that we have proposed. Another possibility is to assess 
which banks are net liquidity providers or net deficit 
consumers of the funds in the central payment invento-
ry pool, and then to charge them post hoc fees. The last 
is similar to Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payment rules 
used in auctions, where the system charges each bank 
the social cost of its payment withdrawn from CPQS 
incurred by the rest of the banks.  
4. Illustration of the Hybrid Mechanism 
To illustrate the cost savings that can be achieved 
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 by pooling payment orders, we offer an example for 
two banks’ incoming and outgoing payment flows 
within a one-minute interval. See Figures 2 and 3. 
Figure 2. Settling Banks’ Account Balances  
 
Figure 3. Pooled Payments in a Centralized System 
 
Suppose that Bank A has an initial account balance 
of $100. The settlement of an outgoing real-time pay-
ment of $130 reduces the bank’s account balance to -
$30. After  time, suppose that the bank receives an 
incoming payment of $180, which brings its account 
balance back to $150. The next incoming payment of 
$70 builds up the account balance to $220. Then an-
other payment of $240 that is settled in real time will 
result in a negative balance of -$20. Since there are no 
other payments, the negative balance will persist 
through time . Further assume the liquidity cost is 
linear in time. The total delay cost for Bank A thus will 
be $30 × + $20 × . Bank B’s order flows can be 
interpreted in a similar manner, and its liquidity cost is 
$60 ×  + 120 × . 
Now, assume the two banks submit their payments 
to a central settlement management system. By pooling 
their payments, the two banks will operate as if they 
are one integrated bank. The combined payments are 
shown in Figure 3. The total liquidity cost of the inte-
grated bank is 140 × = 140 × . For the combined 
payments, the overdraft occurs when Bank B makes a 
large payment at the beginning of  and ends when 
Bank B receives a new payment at the end of .  
Further note that   . This implies that the 
total liquidity cost for Banks A and B operating sepa-
rately will be 30+ 20+ 60+ 120> 140. 
As a result, the integrated bank that is made possible 
by the pooled payments inventory incurs a smaller total 
liquidity cost. The gain can be shared between the two 
banks so the operational cost of each is reduced.  
The real challenge, however, is that individual 
banks may not have an incentive to submit their pay-
ment orders in real time, as this is their private infor-
mation. Since incoming payments are a substitute for 
costly borrowing from the central bank, the banks have 
an incentive to delay submitting payments into the sys-
tem if the delay cost is smaller than the liquidity cost. 
This is the incentive compatibility concern that arises 
in this payments platform setting. 
To illustrate this, assume the cost of per unit liquid-
ity is $10 in each minute. If Bank A can delay the first 
payment of $130 until it receives the incoming pay-
ment $180, then Bank A will incur a delay cost of 
$130, but avoids a liquidity cost of $30 × 10 = 
$300. Thus, Bank A will have an incentive to delay the 
submission of the $130 payment if  is not too long.  
Private information is unlikely to be reported truth-
fully by the banks without appropriate incentives. They 
may wish to manipulate their payment timing to avoid 
credit costs for central bank borrowing. The proposed 
system may alleviate such concerns because combined 
payment settlement enhances liquidity.   
Our professional experience with bank payments 
management and consulting, and knowledge from prior 
research suggest that there are underlying reasons for 
why payment orders for settlement may cluster.8 The 
related agency problems can be alleviated by allowing 
the central bank to price-discriminate against the banks 
in the provision of intraday liquidity. For example, the 
central bank may consider to price intraday liquidity 
and settlement differently at different times during the 
day to give the banks incentives to settle at the desired 
times for different kinds of payments. Whether it does 
so is a policy decision that will be assessed based on 
the quality of the mechanism used for settlements. 
5. A Mechanism Design Experiment 
We will simulate and compare the performance of 
different settlement systems designs. A RTGS mecha-
nism is useful as a measurement benchmark against 
which we can compare alternative queuing and DNS 
performance. The different designs that we will assess 
are based on the frequency of DNS, similar to Willi-
son’s [46] modeling and numerical simulation ap-
proach. It will also be based on the payment settlement 
priority queuing rules that are imposed. Our factorial 
experiment and treatment set-ups are discussed below.  
5.1. Experimental Set-Up 
To understand the effects of key mechanism design 
factors on performance, we propose a controlled exper-
iment with the design description in Table 1.  
 
                                                
8 See Hong Kong Monetary Authority [22] on its 1996 implementa-
tion of a real-time gross settlement system; McAndrews and Rajan 
[31] on Fedwire’s demand for settlement at different times of the 
day; and Willison [46], on intraday morning and afternoon offsets.   
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 Table 1. Mechanism Design Treatment 
MECHANISM 
DESIGN 
EXPERIMENTAL 
CONDITIONS 
EXPERIMENTAL 
TREATMENTS 
Central bank Liquidity credit Uniform price  Price discrimination 
Banks Liquidity needs Low High 
Central  
Order  
Management 
System 
Queue 
DNS system  
  netting times 
Hourly netting  
Morning netting 
Afternoon netting 
Information  
   transparency 
Queue visible 
Queue not visible 
Queue entry 
Random entry 
Threshold rule-based entry 
Value-based entry 
Queue settlement Arrival time-based priority Payment value-based priority 
Liquidity Credit available No credit available 
Credit to provide liquidity. The first experimental 
treatment that we will explore is related to the central 
bank’s decision problem. We assume there is a per unit 
cost  when a bank requires credit from the central 
bank to have sufficient liquidity to settle the payments 
that it is handling. This is an implementation of a uni-
form pricing rule for payments settlement. An alterna-
tive design is to allow the central bank to charge dif-
ferent prices for credit at different times of the day. 
This is a price discrimination rule. For example, there 
might be different hourly, morning or afternoon prices, 
etc. 
The need for liquidity. A bank’s need for liquidity 
largely depends on the time at which its payment or-
ders arrive. This is the focus of our second experi-
mental treatment. We can separately model the pay-
ment order arrivals between different banks with dif-
ferent Poisson arrival rates. In a specific time interval, 
if a higher dollar volume of outgoing payment orders 
arrives, then a bank’s credit needs will increase, creat-
ing pressure for it to borrow from the central bank so it 
will be able to settle funds on an intraday basis. 
Delayed netting settlement. Willison [46] mod-
eled different delayed net settlement approaches, in-
cluding one-hour, morning, and afternoon netting. The 
one-hour netting mechanism has a high frequency of 
payment settlement: net settlement of queued payments 
occurs every hour. The net amounts settle immediately 
thereafter in real time. It flushes the payment order 
queue at the end of the hour. The morning and after-
noon netting approaches are intended to manipulate the 
amount of time delay that is introduced into settlement.   
Information transparency. Information transpar-
ency determines to what degree a bank can observe the 
payments that other banks have submitted to the cen-
tral queue. Payment orders to pay out funds can only 
be offset if there are payment receipts in the central 
queue, from other banks or the central bank taking the 
offsetting position. The level of information transpar-
ency may affect a bank’s order submission tactics.  
Queue entry. There are a number of different ways 
that the payment queue can be handled in terms of or-
ders to pay out funds and receipts of funds. Our exper-
imental treatment for the queue entry condition con-
sists of: (1) a random percentage (say 25%, 50%, 
75%) of payments are selected by the bank to enter the 
queue; (2) payments smaller than some threshold value 
are selected by the bank to enter the queue; and (3) 
payments that are not rank-ordered by priority enter 
the payment queue. The first two cases do not involve 
strategic submission decision-making on the part of the 
bank. A bank can automate queue entry based on pre-
specified criteria. Only in the last case will the bank 
strategically assign the priority it places on payments 
that it wishes to see enter the queue. We call this value-
based queue entry. 
Queue settlement. The next experimental treat-
ment that we will assess involves the impacts of priori-
ty-ranked payment queue settlement based on payment 
order arrival time and dollar value. In contrast, we will 
assess payments that are not priority-ranked based on 
the offsetting funds that are received in the system. 
Liquidity provision. A final experimental treat-
ment is related to the provision of liquidity. The central 
bank can choose to provide its own inventory of re-
ceived payments to banks involved in payments set-
tlement, as a way to supplying liquidity to them. If it 
does this, then the speed of settlement will increase 
when RTGS is used. The central bank will have to bear 
the exposure of credit risk to the banks involved 
though. If the central bank does not supply liquidity, 
the speed of payment settlement will slow down, intro-
ducing operational risks. This is the trade-off between 
liquidity and operational risks.  
5.2. Mechanism Design Evaluation 
Meeting the demand for liquidity to cover payment 
orders that require the outflow of funds from a bank, 
and the speed with which payments are settled are im-
portant criteria for evaluating the performance of a 
payment settlement mechanism. We define several 
measures that will be useful for this purpose. We plan 
to use these measures to evaluate the treatments of the 
experiments. 
Delays. The settlement system delay is the differ-
ence between the time the payment is received by the 
bank and the time it is settled. Total settlement system 
delay is given by this normalized delay index: 
 












 


 


 . The denominator of the in-
dex is the value of the queued payment orders multi-
plied by the time that payments would have been 
queued, had their settlement been delayed until the 
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 time the queue closes. The numerator is the savings 
that arise from the delay: the value of settled payments 
multiplied by the time savings (between when they exit 
the queue and when it closes). The index takes a value 
between 0 and 1. If all queued payments are immedi-
ately settled in real time, then the index will equal 0. 
For end-of-day delayed net settlement, the set  will 
be empty for   , and so the index will equal .  
Overdrafts. An overdraft will occur when a bank’s 
account balance falls below $0. The Federal Reserve 
Bank measures overdraft positions at banks in the U.S. 
at the end of each minute of the day, and from this it is 
able to compute a bank’s average daily daylight over-
draft. This is defined as the sum of all the overdraft 
minutes of the day for the member bank divided by the 
number of operating minutes of the day. The Fed 
charges banks fees based on their average overdrafts 
for credit use. Let       be bank  ’s 
overdraft at time . If the balance is negative, then the 
bank will have an overdraft equal to the absolute value 
of the balance; if the balance is positive, no overdraft 
will occur, and so 
  The average overdraft is 
 






. Coordination among multiple 
banks can reduce their overdrafts. 
Average funds transfer. Another way to evaluate 
the performance of a payment settlement mechanism is 
to assess how much the account balances fluctuate for 
the banks involved in the settlement of payments. For 
this purpose, we define the average funds transfer 
amount for all banks as  





 
. This 
measures the variation in account balances to settle 
payments, and is also useful as a measure of liquidity. 
In addition, the average maximum funds transfer 
measures the average maximum funds that must be 
transferred from an individual account on a per minute 
basis, across the minutes of the day, to complete all 
payments. We also will measure the average absolute 
change in balances that occurs per minute for each 
bank in our experimental simulation. This is the dollar 
amount of funds that a bank has to move for any given 
minute of the day, in or out of its account. We also can 
apply variance measures for how the balance fluctuates 
as banks settle their payments. 
6. Discussion 
In the second quarter of 2014, The SWIFT Insti-
tute [44], the London-based research arm of SWIFT, 
called for research proposals on the “Transformation in 
the Payment and Settlement System Infrastructure.” 
There is great interest on the part of commercial banks, 
central banks, merchants, and banking customers – and 
third-party service providers like SWIFT – around the 
world to move to a more economical and less risky 
infrastructure for retail payments. It is especially inter-
esting as we enter 2015 to consider the role of techno-
logical innovation in payment clearing and settlement, 
as the technologies and industrial organization of pay-
ments change around us.  
The year of 2014, based on the assessment of many 
observers, was a breakout year for the development 
and diffusion of mobile payments [41, 42], where there 
is going to be significant pressure to create new sup-
port for settlement. As mobile payments further spur 
the growth of e-commerce, the volume of retail pay-
ments in the settlement system will increase signifi-
cantly. The system we proposed is scalable by design. 
In fact, our model illustrates that a high number of 
payment requests benefit the banks and the system as a 
whole by improving liquidity. Moreover, Mobile pay-
ments are introducing new roles into the financial sys-
tem. Digital players such as PayPal, Square, Google, 
Adyen, and many others are more equipped than banks 
for innovation with mobile technologies [14]. Thus, the 
settlement system needs to consider a high degree of 
heterogeneity among the participants. Our experiments 
aim to test different system configurations for the ef-
fects of different participants on system performance. 
The trend of mobile payments also suggests the need 
for other kinds of payment settlement systems refine-
ments that deal with low-value Internet payments, utili-
ty services payments, and point-of-sale payments. So it 
will be important to differentiate the increasingly wide 
variety of payments. Our model takes into account 
such payment heterogeneity.   
We see similar developments related to low-value 
transactions and payments in international trade in 
support of supply chain management. For example, 
bank payment obligations, a relatively new means of 
payment solutions in international trade finance, repre-
sent “an irrevocable undertaking given by a bank to 
another bank that payment will be made on a specified 
date after successful electronic matching of data ac-
cording to an industry-wide set of ICC rules” [23]. 
They create the basis for increases in open account 
terms in trade, diminishing the role of documentary 
credits and collections as the primary vehicles of trade 
finance. This is possible since supply chain manage-
ment and procurement-related trade documentation can 
now be tracked more effectively around the world.  
Examples of new document and payment platform-
related providers in this area that are changing the fi-
nancial side of supply chain management include: Orb-
ian (www.orbian.com), GT Nexus (www.gtnexus.com) 
and Bolero (www.bolero.net). These developments 
will make low-value trade transactions more economi-
cal, and support trade and exchange between small 
enterprises in different parts of the world with lower 
transaction costs. This is another reason why the kinds 
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 of approaches that we have discussed related to low-
value domestic payments are likely to be extended to 
handle multi-currency cross-border payments as well. 
These developments suggest a number of changes 
that will need to occur in the operational environment 
in which payment settlement. For new forms of low-
value retail payments, for example, the role that the 
central banks play will need to be revisited. Central 
banks will increasingly need to provide the technical 
infrastructure for low-value payments, just like an elec-
trical utility must handle the delivery of electricity ser-
vices to all sorts of customers.  
A possible alternative is that the geometry of pay-
ment platforms in financial services will shift to favor 
other third-party service providers. An example of this 
in the electronic bill presentment segment of financial 
services in the U.S. is NACHA (www.nacha. org), The 
Electronic Payments Association (previously known as 
the National Automated Clearing House Association). 
It is operated, funded and governed by the financial 
institutions that are its members. Just as we have mod-
eled the central bank as the primary provider of liquidi-
ty, so too is it possible for third-party service providers 
to explore new roles, including the role of providing 
liquidity in exchange for compensation due to the risks 
that are undertaken. 
Other areas of settlement coverage will need to be 
extended to remote and cross-border payments. The 
settlement system should then be ready to take into 
account country-specific regulatory policies and re-
solve any issues related to volatility in currency rates. 
The system in this work is designed to handle shocks 
related to the changes in the number of participants, 
which regulations may generate. 
In addition, their systems will need to change to 
support different kinds of services from what we see 
today. Financial services suffer from a problem that is 
known in the industry as the reference data problem, 
limiting the capacity that firms have to integrate their 
data, software and systems, largely due to insufficient-
ly compatible data scheme and ontologies. The ongo-
ing reference data revolution in financial services is 
driving toward more effective cross-functional data 
standards, and greater systems integration across dif-
ferent business areas. The expected impacts are espe-
cially high in financial markets, retail banking and 
lending, among other commercial banking activities.   
The acceptance of a proposed settlement system is 
determined by the system capability in serving the 
many participants that interact in the payments ecosys-
tem. Our system handles the demand of requests from 
a large number of banks, and it also addresses the prob-
lems of the central bank by appropriately prioritizing 
requests and moderating risk. Meanwhile, the system 
has the potential to be tailored for new roles that 
emerge in the continuing growth of the payment indus-
try. Thus, both new and existing participants in the 
settlement system may have an incentive to adopt the 
proposed model. Moreover, from a social welfare per-
spective, our system offers other substantial benefits. 
To more closely analyze and quantify the benefits of 
the system, we have planned a number of experiments 
to show the payoffs of different participants under var-
ious system configurations. This will illustrate the ap-
propriateness of the proposed model. 
 
7. Conclusion  
In this study, we explore various mechanism de-
signs of a hybrid payment management and settlement 
system that involves elements of both RTGS and DNS. 
The different mechanisms that we presented trade off 
the liquidity costs incurred when a bank borrows funds 
under a line of credit from the central bank, and the 
delayed payment costs that arise from using the central 
payment management system that involves different 
frequencies of periodic netting. We examined a central 
payment queuing system design that incorporates pay-
ment priority queuing rules for settlement with and 
without priority rankings. We will present these find-
ings at HICSS 2015.   
There are two limitations of our approach that will 
affect the external validity of our experimental find-
ings. First, we assume only one payment channel, ra-
ther than several channels  – card payments, Internet 
payments, mobile payments, etc. – as is the case in 
real-world payment services. The limitation that this 
imposes is the likely heterogeneity of risk across the 
channels, the self-selection of users in different chan-
nels, and the underlying differences in automation and 
straight-through processes in the channels. Second, 
there are other proposals that have been discussed 
among central bankers that are not represented in our 
current experimental set-up. As time passes, and we 
gain additional experience with our modeling ap-
proach, we will extend it to ensure fuller coverage of 
existing approaches, while assessing the value of our 
innovations.  
In spite of these issues, we nevertheless expect to 
use this research to encourage discussion in the mini-
track on experimental approaches to business problems 
involving digital intermediation, and to engender a 
fuller understanding of the issues that low-value pay-
ments are creating for clearing and settlement. 
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